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We propose a new protocol for quantum anonymous voting having serious advantages over the
existing protocols: it protects both the voters from a curious tallyman and all the participants from
a dishonest voter in unconditional way. The central idea of the protocol is that the ballots are given
back to the voters after the voting process, which gives a possibility for two voters to check the
anonymity of the vote counting process by preparing a special entangled state of two ballots. Any
attempt of cheating from the side of the tallyman results in destroying the entanglement, which can
be detected by the voters.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
There is a general trend in the modern society to au-
tomatization and computerization of nearly all aspects of
social life, including such subtle area as voting procedure
in various contexts: from state governmental elections to
decision making in rather small groups like parliaments
or councils. As a consequence, a number of protocols for
electronic voting have been developed and successfully
applied in the last decades [1]. Since such protocols meet
the information security problems of confidentiality, au-
thentication and data integrity, they belong to the scope
of the science of cryptography. In the modern electronic
voting systems the information security is provided by
means of public-key cryptography, guaranteeing secrecy
under condition of limited computational resources of a
potential adversary. With the advent of quantum com-
puters [2] this condition becomes impractical, thus inspir-
ing interest in unconditionally secure voting schemes and
protocols. One perspective way to this end is connected
to using quantum systems as information carriers, which
proved to be successful for the development of uncondi-
tionally secure key distribution; the technology known as
quantum key distribution [3] has reached presently the
level of commercial realizations.
In the present work we propose a protocol of anony-
mous binary-valued voting involving n persons (voters),
each making a binary decision bi ∈ {0, 1} and writing
it on a ballot, and one person (tallyman) collecting the
ballots and announcing the result s =
∑
i bi. The pro-
posed protocol possesses two security properties. The
first property is the ”anonymity of voting”, meaning that
the value of individual vote of the ith voter, bi, remains
unknown to other voters, the tallyman, and any third
party possibly monitoring the communication lines, un-
less s = 0, s = n, min{s, n − s} voters cooperate, or
the ith voter discloses his decision. The second property
may be called ”non-exaggeration” and means inability of
a voter to contribute a number different from 0 or 1 to the
final sum s. The anonymity of voting protects the voters
from a curious tallyman (and other parties), who may
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wish to learn who voted in which way, while the non-
exaggeration protects the entire community from mali-
cious voters who may wish to vote twice. The proposed
protocol includes operations with quantum systems and
provides unconditional security for both anonymity and
non-exaggeration, which distinguishes it from other exist-
ing voting protocols, both quantum and classical, briefly
reviewed below.
There is a possibility of guaranteeing the anonymity
of voting unconditionally by means of conventional, i.e.
classical cryptography, based on mathematical encryp-
tion. The corresponding voting protocol [4] is based on
the principle of ”sender untraceability”, meaning such
a communication scheme, where the recipient of several
messages from several senders cannot determine which
message came from which sender. Such a communica-
tion can be realized with unconditional security in the
sense that the recipient is unable to establish any rela-
tion between the messages and the senders, even being in
possession of infinite computational power [5]. However,
the very property of untraceability creates, in the case
of voting, an additional problem of determining which
ballots come from legal voters, since illegal participants
can send ballots in an untraceable way. This problem is
solved by a special ”ballot issuing” protocol (based on the
technique of ”blind signature”) providing each legal voter
with an ”unforgeable” and ”blind” digital ballot, which is
used for sending a vote. The term ”unforgeable” means
that the ballot cannot be cloned, while the term ”blind”
means that the ballots are in no way related to the iden-
tities of legal voters. The ballots in the ballot issuing
protocol are unconditionally ”blind” but only condition-
ally ”unforgeable”, that is a person in possession of rich
enough computational power is able to vote instead of
legal voters. Thus, the property of ”non-exaggeration”
is realized by the overall voting protocol in a conditional
way only.
A quantum protocol for anonymous surveying has been
proposed recently, whose aim is to calculate the sum of
individual contributions of the participants, like in the
voting protocol, but with the contributions being real
numbers from some limited interval rather than binary
digits [6]. The protocol is based on bipartite entangled
2quantum state, whose relative phase carries the sum of
contributions and can be measured only when two parts
of the entangled system are gathered in the same loca-
tion. Application of this protocol to binary-valued vot-
ing meets the problem of multiple voting by a dishonest
voter, which is proposed to be solved by employing two
non-cooperative ballot agents (tallymen). A similar pro-
tocol for quantum voting has been proposed [7], meeting
the same problem of multiple voting, and various ways for
solving it have been discussed requiring also an employ-
ment of two non-cooperative tallymen. Another similar
quantum protocol based on multipartite entanglement
and quantum Fourier transform has been proposed [8],
which is also vulnerable to multiple voting and may be
securely applied only under the assumption that the voter
has no full control of the ballot at the time of writing the
choice. All the mentioned quantum protocols provide
unconditional anonymity of voting, but the property of
”non-exaggeration” is reached on the cost of serious ad-
ditional assumptions, which may be viewed impractical
in some applications. In contrast, the present protocol
provides in unconditional way both ”eavesdropping de-
tection”, meaning non-zero probability of detection of
any attempt to learn the distribution of votes among the
voters, and ”non-exaggeration”, thus protecting the pro-
tocol from dishonest voters from one side and dishonest
tallyman from the other side. Here we consider, like in
Refs. [4, 6, 7, 8], a curious but not malicious tallyman,
whose dishonest action is limited to learning the distri-
bution of votes among the voters, but not to announcing
a wrong value of the voting result s.
The protocol of voting is as follows. The participants
are n legal voters labelled by index i = 1, 2, ..., n and a
tallyman.
1. Each voter chooses either to vote or to check the
anonymity of voting.
(a) In the case of voting the voter makes a bi-
nary decision bi with bi = 0 corresponding to
”no” and bi = 1 corresponding to ”yes” deci-
sion, and encodes it into a state of a two-level
quantum system – qubit – playing the role of
a ballot. Two orthogonal states |0〉i and |1〉i
of a qubit (computational basis) are used for
encoding of the corresponding value of bi.
(b) In the case of anonymity check the ith voter
cooperates with the jth voter, who also
chooses to check the anonymity, and they to-
gether prepare their pair of qubits in the Bell
state |Ψ+〉ij , where the Bell states are defined
as
|Φ±〉ij = 1√
2
{|0〉i|0〉j ± |1〉i|1〉j}, (1)
|Ψ±〉ij = 1√
2
{|0〉i|1〉j ± |1〉i|0〉j}. (2)
2. After the encoding all voters send their qubits to
the tallyman together with their identities. The
latter excludes the possibility of voting for illegal
participants and the possibility for legal voters to
vote instead of their colleagues.
3. The tallyman collects all n qubits and calculates
the number of ”yes” votes by applying to the n-
qubit system the projector valued measure (PVM)
Pˆ (s) =
∑
pi
|m(s, pi)〉〈m(s, pi)|, (3)
where |m(s, pi)〉 is a product state of n qubits in
the computational basis, having exactly s 1’s in the
order determined by the permutation variable pi.
The tallyman announces the voting result ”s votes
yes”.
4. The tallyman sends the qubits back to the voters.
5. The voters make a ballot test.
(a) The voters, who have chosen to vote, measure
their qubits in the computational basis. If the
state of the qubit is different from the sent
one, they state the ballot test failure.
(b) The voters, who have chosen to make an
anonymity check, make a measurement of
their pair of qubits in the Bell basis. If they
get a result which is different from the Bell
state |Ψ+〉ij , they state the ballot test failure.
A few comments to the protocol are necessary. In the
present protocol the statement of the ballot test failure
does not mean a public accusation of the tallyman, it is
rather an information for the personal use by the voter
(e.g. a council member).
The numbering with pi is as follows. All n-bit strings
with exactly s 1’s represent numbers 0 ≤ m ≤ (2n − 1)
in binary notation. Let us sort the strings in increasing
order of the corresponding numbers m and label them
with index pi taking consecutive integer values from 1 to
ds =
(
n
s
)
. In this way for any 0 ≤ s ≤ n we get a set of
strings m(s, pi). The product state of n qubits in compu-
tational basis with individual qubit states |bi〉i, bi being
ith bit from the string m(s, pi), is the state |m(s, pi)〉. For
example, in the case of 5 qubits m(1, 2) = 00010 and
|m(1, 2)〉 = |0〉5|0〉4|0〉3|1〉2|0〉1. The states |m(s, pi)〉 are
mutually orthogonal.
The projector given by Eq.(3) is a projector on the
subspace of n-qubit system, having s states |1〉 and n− s
states |0〉. Let us denote this ds-dimensional subspace
Vs. It is easy to see, that the subspaces corresponding to
different values of s are orthogonal and their sum is the
entire state space of n qubits. The states |m(s, pi)〉 for
given s form a basis in Vs. The application of projective
measurement Eq.(3) corresponds to measuring the num-
ber of ”yes” votes, but not their distribution among the
voters.
Let us see how the protocol guarantees the anonymity
of voting. Consider an event E(µ) consisting in 2k voters
3choosing to check the anonymity, l voters voting ”yes”
and the rest voting ”no”. The state of n ballot qubits
collected by the tallyman is represented by a state
|E(µ)〉 = 1√
2k
∑
pi∈Ω(µ)
|m(k + l, pi)〉, (4)
where Ω(µ) is a set of 2k possible values of pi. The
state Eq.(4) belongs to the subspace Vk+l and therefore
is not affected by the projective measurement defined by
Eq.(3). In the absence of errors the qubits sent back to
the voters will always pass the ballot test in the Step 5.
Now we consider a curious tallyman, who makes an
additional measurement of qubits with the aim to obtain
some information on who voted which way. The simplest
way to learn the vote of the ith voter is just to measure
the ith qubit in computational basis. If the ith voter has
chosen to vote, this attack passes unnoticed. But, if the
ith voter has chosen to check the anonymity with the jth
voter, their state |Ψ+〉ij will be transformed into |0〉i|1〉j
or |1〉i|0〉j with equal probabilities, and the subsequent
Bell measurement will give results |Ψ+〉ij or |Ψ−〉ij with
probabilities 12 . The latter result means the anonymity
check failure. Thus, a curious tallyman faces a risk of
being detected.
The possible attacks from a curious tallyman are in
no way restricted to measurement of single qubits. The
tallyman may wish to learn some partial information con-
cerning the distribution of votes, for example, the total
number of ”yes” votes from a fraction of the voters. As
it was mentioned above, we consider a curious but not
malicious tallyman, who follows the protocol up to pro-
jecting the qubits onto a subspace Vs and correctly de-
termining the value of s. After that the tallyman may be
interested in making an additional measurement of the
qubits. To prove the unconditional ”eavesdropping de-
tection” we need to show that for any such measurement
there is an event E(µ) for which the probability of ballot
test failure is non-zero.
The most general type of measurement on a system
of n qubits, which we call ”the object”, consists in at-
taching to them another quantum system of at least the
same dimensionality (the measuring apparatus), making
a unitary transformation UOA of both the object and the
apparatus, and analyzing the resulting state of the ap-
paratus [9]. Since the states |m(s, pi)〉 for given s form a
basis in Vs, the unitary transformation can be determined
by its action on the basis states:
UOA|m(s, pi)〉O|a0〉A =
∑
pi′
|m(s, pi′)〉O|apipi′〉A, (5)
where |a0〉A is the initial state of the apparatus, and
|apipi′〉A are its final states, generally not normalized. The
subscripts O and A refer to the object and the apparatus
respectively. Here we suggest that the measurement does
not take the state of the qubits outside the subspace Vs,
because otherwise the non-zero probability of ballot test
failure is obvious. Thus, all possible measurements of the
tallyman are parameterized by a set of states {|apipi′〉A}.
To prove the property of ”eavesdropping detection” of
the proposed protocol, we need a result concerning the
structure of strings m(s, pi) for given s. In the following
we imply that s is fixed and the positions of bits in a
string are numbered from right to left.
Lemma. For given s and any two numbers 1 ≤ pi, pi′ ≤
ds, the string m(s, pi
′) can be obtained from the string
m(s, pi) by a finite number of pairwise permutations of 0s
and 1s.
Proof. Let w(s, pi, pi′) be the set of positions of bits, which
are different in m(s, pi) and m(s, pi′). This set is a sum
of two non-overlapping subsets: w0(s, pi, pi
′), containing
the positions of bits which are equal to 0 in m(s, pi),
and w1(s, pi, pi
′), containing the positions of bits which
are equal to 1 in m(s, pi). The lengths of the subsets
w0(s, pi, pi
′) and w1(s, pi, pi
′) coincide, because the num-
ber of 1s in both strings is the same. Let us make a set
of pairs w01(s, pi, pi
′) of the elements of both subsets, tak-
ing one position from w0(s, pi, pi
′) and one position from
w1(s, pi, pi
′) in increasing order. The string m(s, pi) sub-
jected to permutation of bits at positions defined by the
set w01(s, pi, pi
′) gives the string m(s, pi′).
Now we can proceed to proving the property of “eaves-
dropping detection” of the proposed protocol, which is
based on the following theorem.
Theorem. For any measurement, defined by the appa-
ratus states {|apipi′〉A}, where is an event E(µ) for which
the probability of ballot test failure is non-zero, unless all
the states satisfy
|apipi′〉A = |a11〉Aδpipi′ , (6)
i.e. no measurement is done.
Proof. Let us suggest that the apparatus states contain a
non-zero off-diagonal state |apipi′〉A, pi 6= pi′. Consider the
event E(µ), where all voters have chosen to vote and the
distribution of votes corresponds to the string m(s, pi).
For this event the probability of ballot test failure is non-
zero, because the qubits received by the voters are in a
mixture having component |m(s, pi′)〉.
Now let us consider measurements with the apparatus
states satisfying
|apipi′〉A = |apipi〉Aδpipi′ . (7)
Consider any two values pi 6= pi′. Due to the Lemma the
strings m(s, pi′) and m(s, pi) differ by finite number k of
pairwise permutations determined by the set of bit posi-
tion pairs w01(s, pi, pi
′). Consider the event E(ν), where k
pairs of voters, determined by w01(s, pi, pi
′), have chosen
to check the anonymity, and the rest have voted in a way
described by the coinciding bits of m(s, pi′) and m(s, pi).
For this event the state of qubits before the measurement
4is a superposition of 2k states of the type of Eq.(4), in-
cluding |m(s, pi)〉 and |m(s, pi′)〉. After the interaction
with the apparatus these two components get factors
|apipi〉 and |api′pi′〉 respectively, as indicated by Eq.(5),
which leads to a non-zero probability of wrong result for
Bell state measurement, unless |apipi〉 = |api′pi′〉.
In summary, we have proposed a quantum protocol of
voting, guaranteeing that each voter contributes only one
vote and that any attempt of learning who voted which
way is detectable with non-zero probability. The protocol
is a cryptographic primitive, intended to be an element
of a more complicated cryptographic system, providing
complex security of voting, including, e.g. authentication
of legal voters etc. The main weakness of the protocol is
its inability to realize a guaranteed anonymity of a single
voting act, providing only the probabilistic ”eavesdrop-
ping detection”, which is useful for application to many
voting acts during a rather long period. Another weak-
ness is connected to the necessity of cooperation of voters
having opposite decisions, i.e. most probably, belonging
to different fractions. However, to our knowledge, it is
the first voting protocol uniting the protection of the vot-
ers from a dishonest tallyman and the protection of the
participants from a dishonest voter in unconditional way.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the project EQUIND per-
formed within the 6th Framework programme of Euro-
pean Commission.
[1] Secure Electronic Voting, ed. by D. Gritzalis (Kluwer,
2003).
[2] S. Ya. Kilin, in Progress in Optics, ed. E. Wolf, 42, 1
(2001).
[3] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[4] D. Chaum, in Advances in Cryptology: EuroCrypt ’88
Proceedings, edited by C. G. Gu¨nther, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (Springer-Verlag, Berlin), 434, 177–182
(1988).
[5] D. Chaum, J. Cryptology 1, 65 (1988).
[6] J. A. Vaccaro, J. Spring, and A. Chefles, Phys. Rev. A 75,
012333 (2007).
[7] M. Hillery, M. Ziman, V. Buzek, M. Bielikova, Phys. Lett.
A 349, 75 (2006).
[8] S. Dolev, I. Pitowski, B. Tamir, quant-ph/0602087 (2006).
[9] E. P. Wigner, Am. J. Phys. 31, 6 (1963).
